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ABSTRACT
Propelled by the growth of large-scale blockchain deployments,
much recent progress has been made in designing sharding pro-
tocols that achieve throughput scaling linearly in the number of
nodes. However, existing protocols are not robust to an adversary
adaptively corrupting a fixed fraction of nodes. In this paper we
propose Free2Shard– a new architecture that achieves near-linear
scaling while being secure against a fully adaptive adversary.
The focal point of this architecture is a dynamic self-allocation
algorithm that lets users allocate themselves to shards in response
to adversarial action, without requiring a central or cryptographic
proof. This architecture has several attractive features unusual for
sharding protocols, including: (a) the ability to handle the regime of
large number of shards (relative to number of nodes); (b) heteroge-
neous shard demands; (c) requiring only a small minority to follow
the self-allocation; (d) asynchronous shard rotation; (e) operation
in a purely identity-free proof-of-work setting. The key technical
contribution is a deep mathematical connection to the classical
work of Blackwell in dynamic game theory.
1 INTRODUCTION
A classical problem in distributed systems is one of maintaining a
state machine given N nodes, some fraction of which are adversar-
ial (also termed Byzantine). Classical mechanisms for Byzantine-
fault-tolerant (BFT) state-machine-replication (SMR) rely on full
replication of data across multiple nodes; thus offering no scaling
in efficiency as the number of replica nodes increase [1, 14, 17, 18].
Since SMR is the key primitive underlying blockchains, it is no
surprise that the first generation of blockchains also relied on full
replication [30, 34].
Given the unprecedented scale of blockchains, for example, Bit-
coin has N ≥ 10, 000 nodes running its protocol [36], there is com-
pelling practical interest in protocols whose efficiency increases
with the number of nodes. This problem has attracted wide interest
in the distributed systems community with many protocols being
proposed [24, 27, 44]. These pioneering methods offer provable se-
curity as well as near-linear scaling in N of efficiency across various
resources at an individual node including computation, storage and
communication.
While existing solutions offer excellent performance as well as
security against static (or slowly adapting) adversaries, their secu-
rity fails under an adaptive adversary. This problem is compounded
in permissionless blockchain deployments where the possibility
of the adaptive adversary threat is high since nodes do not have
persistent identities. This is evidenced in the significant practical
interest in designing protocols robust to this setting [3, 34, 40, 45].
The main result of this paper is the Free2Shard architecture,
whose performance scales near-linearly with the number of nodes
while being secure against fully adaptive adversaries controlling up
to 50% of the nodes. While existing sharding solutions build upon
a cryptographically certifiable node-to-shard allocation algorithm,
we take the complete opposite view: nodes can allocate themselves
to shards as they please. Our sharding architecture is designed in
such a way that even when the majority of a shard is adversarial, the
safety is not violated. However, an adversary can congregate in a
shard, significantly reducing the fraction of honest shard blocks, and
creating corresponding security threats (especially, liveness) and
also restricting throughput. This is solved by our core contribution:
a dynamic shard allocation algorithm.
The core idea underneath our algorithm is that the honest nodes
re-allocate themselves into shards throttled by the adversary. How-
ever, the adversary can observe the honest nodes’s actions and
re-allocate itself to nullify the honest nodes’ actions. The main tech-
nical contribution of this paper is the identification of a (computa-
tionally simple) dynamic self-allocation policy that can successfully
ensure that the fraction of honest to adversarial nodes in every
shard is greater than 0.5 (thus ensuring sufficient throughput in all
shards). The core technical result is a complete and striking solution
to a dynamic Stackelberg game [39]; our approach is distinct but
inspired by the classical Blackwell approachability in game theory
[12].
The Free2Shard architecture also uses well-established primi-
tives to achieve its requisite properties: (1) an SMR engine, resistant
to adaptive adversaries, to maintain an ordered log of all shard
block hashes, (2) a data availability engine [4, 43] that guarantees
that data written into the SMR are actually available, and a (3) state-
commitment engine based on interactive verification [23, 37] to
ensure low complexity of bootstrapping while rotating.
Furthermore, the protocol has several desirable properties that
makes it attractive from a systems view: (a) asynchronous shard
rotation - nodes do not all rotate at the same time; (b) requires
only a small number of honest nodes per shard; (c) guarantees
the aforementioned properties even when only a small minority
of nodes follow the proposed rotation protocol; (d) can support
heterogeneous shard throughput even when the number of shards
is greater than the number of nodes; (e) the ability to operate in a
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(permissionless) proof-of-work setting with the same guarantees of
throughput scaling and security against a fully adaptive adversary.
The paper is organized as follows. There is a very large number
of recent literature on sharding solutions for blockchains and we
conceptually organize them in terms of their architecture (and
building blocks) in Section 2; this survey also sets the stage to put
the proposed Free2Shard architecture in context (and provide a brief
overview). The key building block of Free2Shard is the dynamic
self allocation engine which is discussed in detail in Section 3. We
describe Free2Shard architecture and various parameter choices in
Section 4; we also provide the security guarantees and efficiency
scaling properties.We conclude in Section 5with a discussion on the
various system properties of Free2Shard in the context of real world
implementation concerns (especially in a distributed permissionless
setting) – synchronization, partial deployment, incentives, inter-
shard transaction handling.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Security Model. We consider a distributed system maintained by
N nodes on a synchronous network. We assume that there is a
natural mechanism to partition the ledger into K distinct shards
of equal size (for example, think of these as distinct applications
sharing a common blockchain or as distinct accounts in a payment
system). The goal is to have the total throughput scaling linearly
with the number of nodes, while each node expends only constant
amount of resources. We will particularly be concerned about three
types of resources: (1) computation resource - the number of
transactions executed per second, (2) storage resource - the number
of transactions / second that can be incrementally stored by the
node 1 and (3) communication resource - the total amount of data
communicated by a node. We will assume that at every node, all
three resources are sufficient to run a non-sharded blockchain with
R transactions-per-second. We will assume that, at any given time,
a fraction β of nodes are controlled by the adversary - they can
deviate arbitrarily from the proposed protocol. We want to prove
security against a fully adaptive adversary, which can corrupt any
subset of nodes based on the public state till that time (as long as
the total number of corrupted nodes is less than its “budget" βN ).
Security encompasses two aspects: (1) safety: transactions once
confirmed remain confirmed for ever, and (2) liveness: new honest
transactions will continue to be added within a finite amount of
time.
This problem has elicited much recent interest owing to the scal-
ability bottleneck in blockchains; the corresponding solutions in the
literature are broadly referred to as sharding methods. Blockchain
sharding methods in the literature can be broadly divided into two
categories: multiconsensus (most sharding solutions) and unicon-
sensus architectures. Each of these architectures provide different
scaling gains and have distinct security vulnerabilities; we discuss
this next.
1We will make the simplifying assumption that the storage per node is growing with
time. This is required for Bitcoin for example. Ideas to relax this requirement, for
example [22], can be naturally applied to our setting too.
Figure 1: Multiconsensus architecture
2.1 Multiconsensus architecture
The multiconsensus architecture relies on each shard having a sep-
arate consensus engine and has a secure cryptographic allocation of
nodes randomly to shards. A further periodic random reallocation
of nodes to shards protects against a weakly adaptive adversary.
The random reallocation is enabled by a node to shard allocation
engine (N2S) which assigns nodes to shards using a (common) dis-
tributed randomness, generated using a consensus engine shared
across all shards and commonly referred to as beacon consensus
engine. A state commitment engine posts root of a Merkle Trie [28]
of a shard’s execution state (the so-called “state commitment") [34]
to the beacon consensus engine at regular intervals; this facilitates
fast reallocation and synchronization to new shards. Figure 1 il-
lustrates a simple example with a node-to-shard allocation that
allocates nodes to distinct shard, on which independent consensus
is performed.
Security. If a (super)majority exists in the overall set of nodes,
then the random node to shard allocation engine transfers this
property to each shard (as long as each shard is large enough –
this weakness is discussed in detail shortly). This guarantees se-
curity of the shard consensus engine, against a static adversary.
Periodic reallocation of nodes to shards enhances the security of
shard consensus against a slowly adaptive adversary.
Scaling. Multiconsensus architecture allows nodes to maintain
only the state of the shard consensus engine and the beacon con-
sensus engine, with beacon consensus engine only containing state
commitments and N2S allocation metadata. Splitting the set of
nodes into K different shards, enables parallel execution of K shard
consensus engines, thus scaling transaction execution by factor K .
A key question is how large can K be, relative to N . With a
random allocation of node to shards, a majority fraction of honest
nodes overall (eg: 60%) translates to majority of honest nodes in
a given shard with high probability (eg. 10−10) only if the size of
the shard is large (i.e., G = 1100 nodes). Since each shard should
have G members, the total number of shards K has to be smaller
than N /G (i.e„ N /1100). This restricts the number of shards and
thus the scaling capability.
Elastico [27] andOmniledger [24] pioneered the study and design
of sharding methodologies for blockchain in academic literature.
Omniledger, built on top of ideas from Elastico, runs N2S alloca-
tion using Randhound(a randomization protocol) on an identity
blockchain. The nodes are gradually rotated between shards to
decrease the synchronization load on the network. Rapidchain [44]
further proposed several improvements by reducing the communi-
cation complexity to sub-linear in the number of nodes, and secure
reallocation of nodes to shards building on the Cuckoo rule.
Key Vulnerability. The key property enabling security of the
multiconsensus architecture is that there is sufficient honest (su-
per)majority in each shard (this suffices for a static adversary) and
the N2S allocation is periodically updated (this allows security
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Figure 2: Uniconsensus architecture
against a weakly adaptive adversary). However the scheme is in-
secure against adaptive adversaries: The N2S allocation is posted
on the beacon chain, hence an adversary knows the list of nodes
participating in any given shard. An adversary can then adaptively
target all nodes allocated to a particular shard and completely cor-
rupt it (this is well within the corruption budget, since the total
number of nodes in a shard is small relative to the network size).
Once a shard is taken over by the adversary, both safety (i.e., the
adversary can approve invalid blocks) and liveness (the adversary
can block honest transactions) can be compromised.
In permissionless settings, the possibility of the adaptive adver-
sary threat is severe. This is reflected in the fact that permissionless
sharding protocols have designed heuristic mechanisms to deal
with this threat. Consider the case of Ethereum 2.0 [34] or Polka-
dot [40]. In these protocols, the primary mechanism for dealing
with adaptive adversaries is to submit commitments of shard state
into the beacon consensus engine, and any node can contest this
commitment by proving that the state transition from previous
commitment includes an invalid transaction. This short proof is
called as a fraud proof and can be posted by anyone to invalidate a
set of shard blocks [4].
While fraud proofs can be used to detect safety violations caused
due to an adaptive adversary, they cannot detect liveness violations.
Indeed, an adaptive adversary can corrupt the majority of any given
shard and ask them to censor all honest transactions. Thus since no
invalid transactions have been included in the ledger, no fraud-proof
can be created. Every time the node-to-shard allocation is rotated,
the adaptive adversary corrupts the newly allocated members, thus
imposing a permanent liveness ban on that shard.
While cryptographic scaling alternatives have been proposed,
we note that this liveness attack persists. For example, mechansims
of verifiable computing [31] such as SNARKs [10], ZK-STARKs [9]
and bullet-proofs[13] have been proposed for scaling blockchains
under differing assumptions on trust and setup. These mechanisms
enable scaling by letting the block proposer guarantee that the
posted state accurately reflect the state after executing the trans-
actions in the block. While these mechansims can be used as a
non-interactive alternative to fraud-proofs for scaling, they have
no way of guaranteeing that transactions have been censored, and
are thus subject to the liveness attack by the adaptive adversary
described above.
2.2 Uniconsensus architecture
The requirement for node-to-shard allocation in multiconsensus
architecture comes from the necessity of allocating nodes to each of
the shard consensus groups. The uniconsensus architecture avoids
this requirement by instead relying on a single consensus engine
to maintain the ordering information of all shard blocks. Thus the
safety of each shard can be directly derived from the safety of the
main consensus engine. The consensus engine only maintains a log
of hash of shard blocks and hence is scalable. A honest consensus
(super)majority is no longer needed in each shard to preserve safety,
thus each node is free to join a shard of it’s choice (self-allocation).
Shard block execution is performed by shard nodes and is decoupled
from shard block ordering performed by the consensus engine. This
architecture does not require each transaction in every shard block
to be valid, rather only guaranteeing the order of transactions in
the shards. Since the consensus engine only maintains the hash of
each block, a separate mechanism is required to ensure that the
full block is available to the shard nodes - this is guaranteed by a
data availability engine. Figure 2 illustrates the 3 engines and their
interactions.
Security. If a majority of honest nodes exist in the overall set
of nodes, the consensus engine is secure. Consider a shard with
less than a majority of honest nodes, the adversarial nodes in the
shard cannot change the log of shard blocks without violating
safety of the consensus engine, thus an adaptive adversary with
less than a global consensus majority cannot violate safety of any
shard. The lack of requirement of a honest majority constraint
within a shard also allows for small shard size. We observe that
uniconsensus architecture solves the shard ledger safety and shard
size vulnerabilities of multiconsensus architecture, but introduces
serious liveness vulnerabilities discussed below.
Scaling. Nodes maintaining the uniconsensus architecture only
maintain the consensus engine and shard log of one shard, the
consensus engine contains a log of shard block hashes, the size of
which is much smaller than shard blocks. Thus, K shards can be
processed in parallel with each node processing only one shard log.
Related work. The idea of scaling by a distributed system by
maintaining a single consistent log with distributed data is pro-
pounded by distributed systems architectures like Corfu [7] and
Tango [8]. Corfu proposed an architecture to maintain a log whose
data is distributed across a cluster of flash drives. Tango built a
sharded system on top of Corfu, where execution is decoupled from
validity and application nodes only need to execute the subset of
entries from the log which are relevant to that application. At a
high level, this fits into the uniconsensus architecture described
here, but Corfu and Tango are designed for resilience to the simpler
crash-faults as compared to the more complex Byzantine faults
considered in this paper.
To handle more complex fault models, works like Aspen [20]
require consensus nodes to maintain and compute the entire ledger
data. However, the data is organized like in Tango, so that client
nodes running an application only need to download the relevant
data. Lazyledger [3] took this idea further to reduce storage and
communication burden on the consensus nodes by allowing data
availability proofs [4].
Vulnerability. Removing N2S allocation by allowing node self-
allocation introduces a serious liveness attack on a shard where
an adversary can concentrate it’s mining power on one shard and
drown out honest shard blocks.We note that to execute this liveness
attack, we do not even require an adaptive adversary. In this attack,
the fraction of honest blocks to the adversarial blocks is greatly
reduced due to a large fraction of adversarial nodes in the shard.
Since the shard has limited resources, it can only support a fixed
number of shard blocks, hence a low honest block to total block
fraction would lead to a throttling of the number of honest shard
blocks added to the shard log and hence throttle throughput. The
honest transactions can no longer be processed in finite time, thus
leading to loss of liveness. An example of this attack is shown in
Figure 5.
2.3 Partial Scaling Approaches
The approaches considered till now achieve scaling while maintain-
ing constant resource usage, i.e., these protocols are computation,
communication and storage efficient. There are other approaches
that are efficient only in some dimensions while being fully re-
silient to an adaptive adversary. For example, Zilliqa [45] achieves
computation-efficient scaling, but it is not communication or stor-
age efficient. Polyshard [26] and coded state machines [25] can
achieve storage efficient scaling but they are not communication
efficient.
To summarize: (1) the multiconsensus sharding architecture is
safe against weakly adaptive adversaries, but loses safety and live-
ness against adaptive adversaries, (2) the uniconsensus sharding
architecture is safe against adaptive adversaries but liveness is
compromised even under static adversaries, and (3) approaches
fully secure against an adaptive adversary are not efficient in all
dimensions.
2.4 Overview of Free2Shard
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of the
Free2Shard architecture which provides full horizontal scaling
(in all the 3 dimensions of storage, compute and communication)
while being secure against fully adaptive adversaries. The architec-
ture builds on the uniconsensus architecture described above with
a new component: the dynamic self-allocation (DSA) engine. The
DSA engine provides an algorithm for honest nodes to re-allocate
themselves to shards, thus reacting to adversaries congregating in
individual shards, and guarantees a strong mathematical property:
the time average fraction of honest to adversarial nodes in every
shard approaches the theoretical optimal (fraction of all honest
nodes, total across all shards). Deriving this dynamic self-allocation
engine and its mathematical guarantee is a core algorithmic and
theoretical contribution of this paper and is discussed in detail in
the next section.
The Free2Shard architecture comprises of the following: (1) State
machine replication (SMR) consensus engine run by all nodes for
maintaining a total order of block hashes, (2) data availability engine
to certify that every block hash written into the SMR is actually
available in that shard, (3) dynamic self-allocation (DSA) engine to
ensure that the fraction of honest nodes in any given shard is high
and (4) state commitment engine, that provides nodes migrating
between shards a quick boostrapping ability to get the state of the
new shard without requiring them to download the entire other
shard. We note that the primitives (1), (2) and (4) are independently
well-understood from the literature and have been used in different
ways in sharding architectures. The unique properties of Free2Shard
arise primarily from the DSA and the way in which it leverages
the other primitives. Figure 3 illustrates the 5 engines and their
interactions and Figure 4 is an example of a Free2Shard system in
action. At a high level, the DSA remedies the liveness vulnerability
of the uni-consensus architecture.
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Figure 3: Free2shard Architecture
Figure 4: Free2shard System in Action
2.5 Key Primitives
We require three key primitives from previous literature in our
Free2Shard architecture, we describe these primitives briefly here.
State Machine Replication. A totally ordered log of the shard
block headers is maintained using a SMR [11]. We assume that the
SMR is robust to an adversary adaptively corrupting at most βc
fraction of the nodes. To achieve scalability, we require that the
total message complexity of SMR be linear in the number of nodes
(so that the communication complexity per node is a constant).
Examples of SMR that satisfy these properties include Ouroboros
Praos and Algorand, since they are robust to fully adaptive ad-
versaries. We note that Ouroboros Praos has βc = 0.5 whereas
Algorand has βc = 13 . Other protocols which have efficient commu-
nication complexity such as HotStuff [42], Sync HotStuff [2], and
Streamlet [15] are robust to varying degrees of adaptivity by the
adversary.
Data Availability engine. We require data availability engine
as a key primitive. Input: Commitment c for a shard block (of size
B) from a honest / adversarial node. Output: Every node deduces
correctly if the block is available. Properties: Nodes inside that shard
expend at most O(B logB) resources. Every node expends at most
O(logB) resources. Assumption: Correct if at least one honest node
inside the shard.
State commitment engine. The state commitment engine is
used to commit the execution state of a shard into the SMR after
executing a block of transactions. We use the interactive state ver-
ification engine from [37] that satisfies the following properties.
We note that verifiable computing methods such as ZK-STARK [9]
can be used instead too. Input: Prior state commitment c , block B
of transactions, claimed state s after executing B beyond c . The
claimed state can be posted either by a honest node or an adversary.
Output: Every node correctly agrees on whether s is correct or not.
Properties: Requires a distinct committee forO(logB) rounds. Every
committee member spends at most O(N logB) resources. All other
nodes expend at most O(logB) resources. Assumption: Correct if
there is at least one honest node in the committee of each round.
2.6 Our Contribution
Key Properties Free2Shard satisfies the following properties:
• Free2Shard is safe as long as β (fraction of nodes are con-
trolled by the adversary) is less than βc , the critical threshold
of fraction adversaries that can be tolerated by the underly-
ing SMR consensus engine.
• Free2Shard is live as long as γ > 0 fraction of nodes follow
the self-allocation policy.
• Free2Shard can supportK < Θ( NlogN ) shards each of through-
put at least R/2 transactions per second. Thus we get a total
scaling of Θ( NlogN ) relative to running a single shard.
We provide a short summary of why Free2Shard achieves the
security and scalability properties below. A detailed discussion is
deferred to Section 4.
• Each shard block is safe as long as the SMR engine is safe,
which is true till β < βc for the SMR even under an adaptive
adversary.
• The shard continues to include honest transactions as long
as honest nodes get to propose blocks. Since our DSA guar-
antees that the long term fraction of honest blocks in a given
shard is close to 0.5, liveness is guaranteed even against an
adaptive adversary. Furthermore, we show that even a con-
stant fraction γ of nodes following the DSA is sufficient to
ensure a long term fraction of honest blocks in any shard is
close to γ .
• The overhead for each node associated with a block of size
B in any shard is O(logB) since the overhead of each prim-
itive is O(logB). SMR requires O(logB) overhead to read
the Merkle proof of each chunk, data availability and state
commitment also require O(logB) resources as stated in
the primtives above. The total overhead ratio is O(K log BB ),
which can be made arbitrarily small by making B large.
3 DYNAMIC SELF ALLOCATION ENGINE
The dynamic self allocation engine is a sequential algorithm that
guides honest nodes to allocate themselves to shards in different
proportions, adapting to the past adversarial allocation behavior.
The DSA algorithm aims to guarantee that the time average fraction
of honest to adversarial nodes in any shard is above any desired
level. A fundamental information theoretic question is a characteri-
zation of the space of time average fractions that can be achieved
by the best DSA algorithm (here we do not constrain the computa-
tional complexity of algorithm). A practical, and also theoretical,
question is the characterization of the performance of computa-
tionally simple DSA algorithms and the explicit identification of
such algorithms. We formally state these questions below; the main
result of this section is a complete solution to these theoretical
questions – this comprises the key technical contribution of this
paper. We discuss connections of our results to game theoretic
literature (dynamic Stakelberg games [39]) and is of independent
mathematical interest.
Problem Statement. There are N nodes (including both hon-
est and adversarial) and K shards. The fraction of honest nodes is
(1 − β) = γ (the “power" of honest nodes) and each honest node
uses the DSA algorithm to allocate itself to a shard. The adversaries
collude, observe the honest node allocations and then allocate them-
selves. The goal of the adversary is to minimize the ratio of honest
to total nodes (the “honest fraction") in any shard – this will throt-
tle the throughput of the shard leading to liveness vulnerabilities
(as discussed in Section 2.2). The honest nodes switch at periodic
intervals (time scale of confirmed blocks in the consensus engine).
Even though the adversarial nodes can switch faster, we see that
they cannot reduce the time average honest fraction of the worst
performing shard further than reallocating themselves at the same
rate as honest nodes. This leads to the following mathematical for-
mulation of a vector dynamic game described below, focusing on
the mean honest fraction allocations to each shard. The actual DSA
algorithm is to be implemented by every node and is necessarily dis-
tributed – a randomized distributed implementation (with the goal
of mimicking the mean honest fraction prescribed by the solution
to the dynamic game below) is discussed in a later Section 3.3.
We suppose a timescale where the consensus engine confirms
one block per unit time. We measure the honest node fractions
in shard at integer times t ; this fraction would correspond to the
ratio of honest blocks to total blocks in any shard, formed in time
[t − 1, t] referred by the consensus block confirmed at time t . We
refer to the interval [t − 1, t] as round t . Let ri [t] denote the honest
node fraction at time t (for round t ) in shard i and r¯i (t) denote the
time-average.
ri (t) = γi (t)
γi (t) + βi (t) ; r¯ (t) =
1
t
t∑
j=1
ri (j). (1)
Let r(t) = [r1(t), r2(t), .., rK (t)] and r¯(t) = [r¯1(t), r¯2(t), .., r¯K (t)] de-
note the corresponding vectors encompassing all the K shards.
We define the main optimization objective function, the solution
of which is the honest strategy that can achieve a worst case shard
honest fraction ofψ (K) given any worst-case adversarial action:
ψ (T ) = max
{ft }t
min
{βi (t )}i,t
min
i
{r¯i (T )} . (2)
A DSA algorithm specifies the honest node re-allocation strategy:
for each t the re-allocation is a function as follows:
ft : (β(1), ...β(t − 1),γ (1), . . .γ (t − 1)) → γ (t), (3)
satisfying the constraint
∑K
i=1 γi (t) = γ .
We defineψft (K): the honest fraction of the worst performing
shard under a worst case adversary as follows:
ψft (T ) = min{βi (t )}i,t mini {r¯i (T )} . (4)
Note that the adversary action in round t is allowed to depend on
the honest node re-allocation policy at round t .
Information Theoretic Limits. We see that any optimal hon-
est strategy cannot obtain a time averaged honest fraction greater
than γ in the worst performing shard under an optimal adversarial
strategy:
ψ (T ) ≤ γ . (5)
The above inequality is obtained since irrespective of the honest
allocation, an adversary can simply replicate the honest node allo-
cation and set βi (t) = βγ γi (t), thus rendering the honest fraction of
each shard as γ . The key question is whether this upper bound is
actually achievable. If so, then this would be a striking and positive
A1,B1,C1
A2,B2,C2
A3,B3,C3
A2
B1 C1
SMR
L
e
d
g
e
r
Shard 1 Shard K
A4,B4,C4
A1
B2 C2
A3 B3 C3
A4 B4 C4
Figure 5: Throughput suppression: Adversaries congregate in shard 1.
result: the honest nodes can rebalance the allocations optimally, i.e.,
the time average fraction of honest nodes in each shard is always
the same as the overall fraction of honest nodes (which is γ ). This
would imply that the adversary is ineffective in overcrowding any
shard, even minimally. The main result of this section is that this is
indeed achievable, for large enough time windowT over which the
average is taken. Towards building an intuition towards this result,
and the nature of the optimal honest policy and the corresponding
performance, we discuss next a few baseline honest node strategies
and analyze their performance.
3.1 Approach
Static strategies. Consider a static self-allocation scheme where
honest nodes allocate themselves uniformly to one of K shards, i.e.,
γi (t) = γK ∀i ∈ [K]. This strategy is very vulnerable to adversarial
action: an adversary simply targets shard 1 and throttles its honest
fraction by allocating all its power to this shard (i.e., β1(t) = β).
This renders the honest fraction of shard 1 as γ /Kγ /K+β = O(1/K)
which approaches 0 for large K and is very sub-optimal compared
to the information theoretic limit. Thus the honest nodes have to
adapt to adversarial action.
A simple dynamic strategy. A simple adaptive action by the
honest nodes is the following: half the honest nodes distribute
themselves uniformly randomly across K shards and the other half
follows the adversarial distribution of the past round.
ft := γi (t) = { γ2β βi (t − 1) +
γ
2K }. (6)
The idea is that if the adversary congregates in one shard, then at
least half the honest nodes react to this congregation and ameliorate
any degradation in performance in that shard. We are able to show
the following performance result; the proof is in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 3.1. For large enough T ,
Ω
(
1
logK
)
≤ ψft (T ) ≤ O
(
log logK
logK
)
. (7)
This shows that this dynamic allocation policy is much im-
proved compared to the static allocation policy (from O(1/K) to
O(1/logK)), but the performance still degrades to zero as K grows,
while the information theoretic limit is a constant (independent of
K ). An adversarial attack on shard 1 which renders a honest fraction
of O( log(K )log(log(K )) ) is illustrated in Figure 6. We see from the proof in
Appendix A.1 that the analysis is very specific to the structure of
the dynamic honest policy in Equation (6) and this does not provide
any intuition towards designing an improved honest policy. We
make connections to game theoretic literature next, which provides
Shard 1
Shard 1
Shard 1
Shard 1
Figure 6: Simple DSA policy from Equation (6): adversary gradually at-
tacks shard 1, and honest nodes follow it with a delay of one round, the
attack is reset when the adversary has allocated all it’s power to shard 1
us a broader view of this problem and classical results associated
with this class of max min games.
Dynamic games. Our core optimization problem in Equation (2)
looks somewhat similar to an online convex optimization problem
[5]. However, the combinatorial optimization mini r¯i (T ) outside
the summation is a key aspect of departure from the online convex
optimization setting, rendering that approach nowhere immediate.
An alternative view is provided by dynamic Stackelberg games
[39], with zero step rewards and a terminal reward of mini r¯i (T ),
where the adversary can take action after knowing the action of
the honest nodes. However, solving the optimal honest policy itera-
tively (dynamic programming approach) does not yield an analytical
form due to the specific reward design we have. If the reward of
mini r¯i (T ) were replaced by the vector r¯ , then this game is related
to the classical Blackwell approachability [12] (an extension of von
Neumann’s classical minimax matrix game [38]) and provides guid-
ance as to how the scalar reward of mini r¯i (T ) be addressed. This
is the crux of our main result, presented next.
3.2 Dynamic Self allocation
Consider the following Free2Shard policy, f F2St where γi (t) is gen-
erated as follows:
f F2St : γi (t) = γ
ui (t − 1)∑K
i=1 ui (t − 1)
; ui (t − 1) = (γ − r¯i (t − 1))+. (8)
The main idea is to allocate honest power to shards that are
performing the worst, i.e., shards with highest lag from the target
honest fraction γ and not waste any honest power by allocating
zero power to shards which have time averaged honest fraction
greater than the target. Our main result is in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. For any adversarial strategy,
ψf F2St
(T ) ≥ γ
(
1 −
√
K
T
)
. (9)
We observe that ψf F2St (T ) ≥ cγ for all T >
K
(1−c)2γ 2 , this means
that we achieveψf F2St (T ) is arbitrarily close to the information the-
oretic limit of γ forT large enough, thus providing tight bounds on
approaching the information theoretic limit.
Figure 7: r¯ (t ) and r (t + 1) lie on different sides of the hyperplane Pt+1
Proof:We show that following f F2St allocation, the average hon-
est fraction vector r¯(t) approaches the convex setCγ in RK defined
as follows:
Cγ = [γ , 1]K x ∈ [0, 1] (10)
so r¯(t) ∈ Cγ implies mini r¯i (t) ≥ γ . Let π(t) denote the Euclidean
projection of r¯(t) to the convex set Cγ . Let Pt+1(x) denote the hy-
perplane perpendicular to π(t)−r¯(t) and containing π(t). Observe
that π(t) − r¯(t) = u(t):
Pt+1(x) : u(t).x − γ
K∑
i=1
ui (t) = 0. (11)
We show using the strategy space inequality in Appendix A.2.1
(Equation (27), set s = K ), the following:
u(t) · r(t + 1) − γ
K∑
i=1
ui (t) ≥ 0 ∀β(t + 1) (12)
u(t) · r¯(t) − γ
K∑
i=1
ui (t) ≤ 0
The above two inequalities imply that r(t + 1) and r¯(t) lie on
different sides of Pt+1 as depicted in figure 7
Let us define dt as the euclidean distance of r¯ (t) from the convex
setCγ , i.e. dt = | |r¯ (t) −π(t)| | , d(a,b) = | |a −b | | for any a,b ∈ RK .
we show that
d2t+1 = d
2(r¯(t + 1),π(t + 1)) ≤ d2(r¯(t + 1),π(t))
= ∥r¯(t + 1) − π(t)∥22
=
 tt + 1 r¯(t) + 1t + 1 r(t + 1) − π(t)22
=
 tt + 1 (r¯(t) − π(t)) + 1t + 1 (r(t + 1) − π(t))22
= ( t
t + 1 )
2 ∥r¯(t) − π(t)∥22 + (
1
t + 1 )
2 ∥r(t + 1) − π(t)∥22
+
2t
(t + 1)2 (r¯(t) − π(t)).(r(t + 1) − π(t)).
(t + 1)2d2t+1 − t2d2t ≤ ∥r(t + 1) − π(t)∥22
+ 2t · ((π(t) − r¯(t)) · (π(t) − r(t + 1))).
r(t + 1) and r¯(t) lie on different sides of Pt+1 hence,
2t · ((πCγ (t) − r¯(t)).(πCγ (t) − r(t + 1))) ≤ 0
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Figure 8: Evolution of ( ¯r1(t ), ¯r2(t )), observe that the distance of
( ¯r1(t ), ¯r2(t )) from (0.5,0.5) reduces with time (arrows signify causality)
Moreover,
r(t + 1) − πCγ (t)22 ≤ γ 2K and combining the above
two inequalities, we get: (t + 1)2d2t+1 − t2d2t ≤ γ 2K . Summing
terms over t ∈ {1, ..,T − 1}, we get dT ≤ γ
√
K
T and observe that
dT ≥ (γ −mini r¯i (T ))+. Equivalently, mini r¯i (T ) ≥ γ −dT and thus
ψf F2St
(T ) ≤ γ (1 −
√
K
T ).
The convergence of r¯i (t) for 2 worst performing shards is illus-
trated in figure 8.
3.3 Distributed Dynamic Self Allocation
Thus far we have studied the dynamic self allocation policy in the
lens of the mean fraction of the honest nodes. What we really need
is a (randomized) DSA policy that can be run by each node locally.
A natural strategy is the following: each honest node uses the
Free2Shard DSA policy to calculate the honest node fractions for
each shard and then allocates itself to one of the shards randomly,
proportional to the fractions prescribed by the Free2Shard policy.
While this strategy is natural and performs well in experiments
(cf. Section 3.5) we have not been able to formally evaluate its
theoretical performance. A slightly modified strategy, described
below, does enable a theoretical evaluation.
Free2Shard-dist DSA policy diverges from Free2Shard DSA pol-
icy in the following way: The policy aims to achieve a honest node
fraction in each shard of h, strictly smaller than the information
theoretic optimal value of γ . With a slight abuse of notation, we
define ui (t − 1) = (h − r¯i (t − 1))+. The algorithm allows honest
nodes to focus on s out of K shards at a time; we order the quanti-
ties u1(t − 1), . . . ,uK (t − 1) and define u˜i (t − 1) = ui (t − 1) if the
index i is in the highest s order statistics. For other indices i , we
set u˜i (t − 1) = 0. We follow the Free2Shard policy by substituting
u˜i (t −1) in place ofui (t −1) in Equation (8), so γ˜i = γ u˜i∑K
i=1 u˜i
. More-
over, to ensure that each of the s prioritized shards get some honest
nodes, we lower bound their prescribed honest policy to q/(1+2q)s ,
for some constant q close to 0. We ensure this by projecting the
non-zero prescribed honest power γ˜i (t) to the set Cq/s ; we use the
notation Proj(γ˜(t),Cq/s ) to denote such Euclidean projection. In
summary, Free2Shard-dist DSA policy is the following:
f F2S-distt (h,q, s) : γ(t) =
1
1 + q/γ Proj(γ˜(t),Cq/s ). (13)
Notice that the honest node fraction is no longer deterministic
since the honest node allocation is randomized (and follows a multi-
nomial distribution); each shard’s marginal distribution of honest
power is Γi (t) is distributed as 1N Binomial(n,γi (t)) and each shard’s
marginal distribution of honest node fraction ri (t) is distributed
as Γi (t )
Γi (t )+βi (t ) . Notice that ψf F2S-distt is now a random variable, and
we show a concentration bound below; the proof is deferred to
Appendix A.2. This result shows that with high probability the
information theoretic upper bound of γ can be achieved by the
appropriate honest policy.
Theorem 3.3. For any adversarial strategy, with probability 1−δ ,
ψf F2S-distt (h,q,s)(T ) ≥ γ
©­«hγ − 1γ
√
h2
K
T
+ 4hs
√
2
T
log 2
δ
ª®¬ . (14)
We note that h = (1 − se−n
q
(1+2q)s (−c+cloдc+1)) csK (1−2q)γ can be
set close to γ by choosing the variables q, s, c appropriately.
Outline of Proof. Following the same pattern as the proof of
Free2Shard DSA, we show that the average honest fraction vector
r¯(t) approaches the convex set Ch .
We first prove a strategy space inequality which states the fol-
lowing:
max
γ
min
β
K∑
i=1
ui (t − 1) γ˜i (t)
γ˜i (t) + βi (t) ≥ γ
s
K
K∑
i=1
ui (t − 1) (15)
We then modify the target allocation policy as γ which ensures
that γi ≥ bs as shown in Equation (13) where b is a constant and
q = b/(1−2b). The new allocation policy leads to amodified strategy
space inequality given by:
min
β
∑
i
ui (t − 1) γi (t)
γi (t) + βi (t) ≥
s
K
γ (1 − 2b)
K∑
i=1
ui (t − 1) (16)
We now show that if every honest node chooses a shard ran-
domly according to a choice distribution given by γ defined in
Equation (13), we get a stochastic strategy space inequality given
by:
EΓ(t )
[
min
β (t )
u(t − 1).r(t)
]
≥ h
K∑
i=1
ui , (17)
similar to Equation (12) in Free2Shard DSA proof. We then show
that following the above honest allocation strategy time averaged
honest fraction approaches the convex setCh with distance decreas-
ing with time T as:
d2T ≤ h2
K
T
+
2
T
T−1∑
t=1
t
T
(Yt ) (18)
where Yt = (EΓi (t ) [
∑
i ui (t − 1)ri (t)] − ((u(t − 1)) · r(t)) is a mar-
tingale difference sequence with respect to the history at time t and
|Yt | ≤ 2hs . Using the Azuma- Hoeffding inequality, we have
P
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
Yt
 > ϵm
)
≤ 2e−
T ϵ2m
8h2s2 . (19)
This allows us to conclude that with probability (1−δ ), the distance
to convex set converges to 0 as d2T ≤ h2 KT + 4hs
√
2
T log( 2δ ). We
observe that dT ≥ (γ −mini r¯i (T ))+. Equivalently, mini r¯i (T ) ≥ γ −
dT and thusψf F2S-distt (h,q,s)(T ) ≥ γ
(
h
γ − 1γ
√
h2 KT + 4hs
√
2
T log
2
δ
)
.
3.4 Number of Shards and Nodes
Conventional modeling (and the corresponding sharding literature)
supposes that the number of nodes N is much larger than the
number of shards K . This modeling is central to the working of
node to shard (N2S) allocations: this way each shard has a sufficient
number of honest nodes. In practice, one can imagine several shards
being inactive during certain periods of time and conceivably K >
N . In this scenario, we can derive a tighter information theoretic
bound than the one in Equation (5) sinceψ (T ) = γ implies that each
shard remains active at all rounds even if there aren’t sufficient
honest nodes to maintain all the shards in any round; this is done
next.
Information Theoretic Limit The sum of honest nodes of all
shards is limited by the total number of honest nodes in the system,
since at every round, there will be at most N shards which can be
maintained by honest nodes, and the adversary can set it’s policy:
Bi (t , Γi (t)) = βγ Γi (t). Thus, the honest fraction of the N out of K
shards which are non zero is γ , yielding the following bounds:
max
{ft }t
min
{βi (t )}i,t
∑
i
{r¯i (T )} ≤ γN (20)
max
{ft }t
min
{βi (t )}i,t
min
i
r¯i (T ) ≤ 1
K
∑
i
r¯i (T )
ψ (T ) ≤ γN /K . (21)
We note that the Free2Shard-dist self allocation strategy smoothly
meets this new upper bound; this is done via the honest nodes focus-
ing only on a subset of shards in a round to achieveψf F2S-distt (h,q,s)(T )
which is within a O( 1logN ) multiplicative factor of the improved
information theoretic upper bound: Theorem 3.3 states that for
large enough T , ψf F2S-distt (h,q,s)(T ) ≥ 0.5h. We observe that h ≥
a
logN
N
K where a depends on the choice of c,q and s =
N
4 logN . Thus,
ψf F2S-distt (h,q,s)(T ) ≥
a
2 logN
N
K γ which is withinO( 1logN )multiplica-
tive factor of the information theoretic limit in Equation (21).
3.5 Experiments
We empirically verify the robustness of our protocol against various
randomness associated with a practical implementation such as the
(theoretically accounted for) randomness in honest node allocation
and the bias in estimation of adversarial and honest distributions.
Our implementation consists of K = 100 shards with varying num-
ber of nodes N and heterogenous target honest node fractions. This
experiment models a realistic setting where the honest nodes do not
know the honest fraction of all shards, have to estimate the honest
node fraction in the shards by calculating the net power (i.e., total
number of nodes) and the estimated honest node allocation. We
set β = 0.5 in all our experiments, the largest possible adversarial
power that can be tolerated for security of the consensus engine
(and the overall Free2Shard architecture).
Adversarial strategy . The adversarial action is worst-case and
cannot be empirically evaluated, so we identify an adversary that
has the following capabilities. It can throttle the honest node frac-
tion in any shard to be as small as logKK for as long as τ =
logK
log logK .
We state this formally, deferring the proof to Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3.4. Consider an adversary that works in periods of
length τ . In any period at a round t , the adversary uniformly allocates
its power on the K
(
1
logK
)t
worst performing shards. The period ends
at t = τ and the adversary restarts with t = 1.
Then for any honest policy, the worst case shard’s honest node
fraction is less than O( logKK ) for all rounds t ≤ τ .
Homogeneous sharding with N > K . With K = 100,N =
1000, β = 0.5 we simulate the adversarial strategy above and the
distributed (randomized) versions of Free2Shard and Free2Shard-
dist as the honest policy. In this homogeneous setting, we aim to
maintain the same honest node fraction in each of the shards (equal
to 0.5 here). We plot the worst time average honest node fraction
across the shards as a function of time in Figure 9a and make the
following observations. (a) Free2Shard and Free2Shard-dist have
similar performances and favorable to the theoretical upper bound
(derived for the worst-case adversary); (b) since N is sufficiently
larger than K , there are enough honest nodes to allocate to each
shard and thus the honest node fraction in each shard is able to
meet the target.
Homogeneous shardingwithN < K .WithN = 10,K = 100, β =
0.5, we simulate the adversarial strategy above and the distributed
(randomized) versions of Free2Shard and Free2Shard-proj as the
honest policy. In this homogeneous setting, we aim to maintain the
same honest node fraction in each of the shards – since there are
more shards than nodes, the largest possible target is N (1−β )K = 0.05.
We plot the worst time average honest node fraction across the
shards as a function of time in Figure 9b and make the following
observations. (a) Free2Shard and Free2Shard-proj have similar per-
formances and favorable to the theoretical upper bound (derived for
the worst-case adversary); (b) even though N is sufficiently smaller
than K , so each node’s randomized decision cannot be expected to
average the honest node fraction in each shard to the deterministic
values proposed by Free2Shard, we see that the performance in
meeting the targets is surprisingly strong. A theoretical justification
for this phenomenon is of great interest and is deferred to future
work.
Heterogeneous sharding with N < K . In practice, different
shards have different activity levels, demanding different target
levels of participation from the nodes. We propose the target honest
fraction of each shard to decrease as 1/(⌈i/5⌉+1), with N = 10,K =
100, β = 0.5; where i is the index of the shard. We plot the time
average honest node fraction across the shards at the end of the
simulation in Figure 10 and make the following observations. (a)
Free2Shard supports heterogeneous target honest fraction vector
allocation across shards; (b) even though N is sufficiently smaller
than K , we can set some shards to achieve a target honest factor of
1 − β which is the best we can achieve even with N > K . We see
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Figure 9: Homogeneous sharding comparison between Free2Shard and
Free2Shard -dist
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Figure 10: Comparison between target honest fraction set for hetero-
geneous sharding and average honest fraction achieved at the end of the
experiment
that the performance in meeting the targets is strong; a theoretical
justification for this strong performance for heterogeneous sharding
is of great interest and is deferred to future work.
4 FREE2SHARD ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
In this section we discuss in detail the Free2Shard sharding archi-
tecture, an overview of which was provided in Section 2.4.
Each node i in the network has an identity which is comprised of
a pair (nski ,npki ) the node secret key (known only to the node) and
node public key (known to everyone). We will assume that the over-
all blockchain can be split into K sub-ledgers (called shards) each
comprising of a entirely independent set of transactions (submitted
by shard clients). We can use methods developed for inter-sharding
in other sharding algorithms (for example, [24]), and will briefly
allude to this in Section 5. Each shard will have its own peer-to-peer
(p2p) network in which shard transactions are broadcasted. Any
node desirous of reading the activities of the shard can join the p2p
network.
Free2Shard sharding architecture relies on a State Machine
replication engine (SMR) maintained by all the peers in the network
to create a total ordered log. Shard blocks are ordered using the hash
pointers on the ordered log. Since the ordered log contains only
hash of each shard block, data availability is ensured by invoking
a separate voting mechanism based on a recent primitive, Coded
Merkle Tree [43]. Free2Shard-dist DSA policy ensures liveness and
high throughput against adaptive adversary. Finally, the rotation of
nodes to a new shard is facilitated by periodic state commitments
on the ordered log. We explain each of these functionalities below
and show that they have o(1) overhead as the shard block size B
becomes large.
The adaptive-adversary resistant SMR has amechansim for grow-
ing the ordered log based on transactions sent to it, we further
assume that it has an upper-bound on the latency of including hon-
est transactions into the ordered log (which is independent of N ).
This property holds for both the Algorand and Ouroboros Praos
protocols. We will assume that the ordered log is comprised of a
sequence of transactions organized into blocks (we will refer to the
SMR-block-number as the latest block number in the SMR). We do
not require fresh randomness from the ledger, but in practice, this
can be useful and in which case instead of the SMR-block-number,
we will use the randomness associated with SMR-block-number.
We are now ready to discuss the Free2Shard architecture and its
components in detail.
4.1 Free2Shard components and design
Shard block mining:We create a “mining” mechanism (a permis-
sioning mechanism) for allowing the creation of shard blocks. A
node i can propose a shard block for inclusion in the ordered log if
H (npki , SMRno ) is small, whereH is a cryptographic hash function.
A node will have to specify one of the shard-id on which wishes
to mine a block, as well as the hash of the shard block. The SMR
engine collects all the hash outputs from the nodes, and selects the
smallest κ(a constant) output values per shard to propose blocks.
The shard-hashes enter the ordered log. Note that each peer can
only generate at most one shard-block per SMR-block. This ensures
that even adversarial nodes have to make a choice on which shard
it is mining.
The above mining protocol ensures if Γi · N and βi · N nodes
are interested in mining in shard i , then, owing to the uniform
nature of the hash output string, the average fraction of honest
shard blocks mined is Γi/(Γi + βi ), and consistent with the quantity
studied in Section 3. The mining mechanism thus ensures that if
a shard has a capacity to process R transactions per second it will
process RΓi/(Γi + βi ) honest transactions per second.
While we describe our protocol using hash functions for sim-
plicity, in order to be resilient to an adaptive adversary, we will use
verifiable random functions (VRF) [16, 29]. VRF ensures that the
output of the function is not predictable by any other node a priori.
We refer the reader to Section B.1 for a brief description of VRF.
Shard ledger: The ordered log of shard block hash pointers cor-
responding to a given shard-id induces a shard ledger comprising
of the corresponding shard blocks. We note that the architecture
does not guarantee validity of every transaction in the shard ledger,
since SMR nodes do not checked for validity. However, this is not
an issue as long as there is a consistent execution engine that will
interpret the shard transactions. This is a classic idea in distributed
systems of decoupling execution from ordering [41], and has found
applications in blockchain scaling architectures as well [8].
Data Availability: Even though the shard blocks need not be valid,
they still need to be available for retrieval. We accomplish this avail-
ability check using a mechanism by which all nodes vote through
the SMR on whether a block is available. The key idea is the follow-
ing: the node whose shard block hash got included in the ordered
log, now sends forth small chunks of the block encoded appropri-
ately, one for each node. The original block is divided intoK chunks
and is coded to form N chunks. Which chunk is to be sent to which
node is determined by aH (npki , SMRno ) (a random mapping of the
public key of the recipient npki along with the SMR block number).
Now in the SMR, each node casts its vote on whether a previous
shard block pointer is valid or not, depending onwhether it received
its chunk. We need to establish three properties: (1) enough number
of nodes received the chunk, (2) the chunk satisfied the hash of the
coded block, and (3) the block was correctly coded (as an adversary
may do otherwise). The first constraint can be satisfied as long as
there is a majority of votes cast for validity. The β < 0.5 fraction
of nodes are adversarial and may lie, however, the remaining a =
0.5 − β honest nodes have indeed received the chunk. Thus as long
as aN chunks are sufficient to reconstruct the block using the code,
property (1) is satisfied. Property (2) can be satisfied by requiring
that the posted hash pointer corresponds to the coded block rather
than the uncoded block. Finally, Property (3) is the most subtle
property to satisfy. We note that recent work on Coded-Merkle-
Tree has solved this problem by enabling short fraud proofs (short
statements of length Θ(logB)) that can prove that the block was
incorrectly coded - and such proofs are readily forthcoming as long
as there is enough chunks to decode a correctly coded block. A
shard block, even when voted for by a majority, will be considered
invalid, if some node posts a fraud proof.
State commitment:When nodes rotate between shards, they will
need to fully download the new shard ledger as well as execute it
from the beginning of history in order to synchronize to that shard.
This can be extremely resource intensive and can completely drown
out any gain due to sharding. We point out the multi-consensus
protocols such as [24, 27, 44] which assume majority-honest in each
shard do not have this problem, as they can immediately assume
that any previous transaction that has been signed by a majority is
valid. Instead, if the node could acquire a trustworthy state after
executing till the previous block, it can easily rotate into the shard.
We note that one possibility is to use verifiable computing primitives
to assert that the state of the shard ledger as executed by another
node is correct [9, 10, 31], however, these results are still not yet
practically applicable to general program execution, so we resort
to a different mechansim for state commitments.
State commitments consists of the merkle root of a Merkle Patri-
cia Trie [28] of a shard’s execution state, which is posted at regular
intervals of E SMR-blocks called epochs. They serve as checkpoints
for fast bootstrap and inter-shard transactions. The state commit-
ment is posted to the SMR engine by a epoch leader who is elected
every epoch. Each node locally computes H(nski ,SMRno , shard-id)
for all K shards. If for shard i , the output of the hash is less than
a threshold, the node assigns itself as a epoch leader for the next
epoch in that shard. The threshold is set globally to ensure that
roughly a constant number of nodes are always elected as epoch
leaders per shard.
The state commitment is termed invalid if it corresponds to an
incorrect execution state. We can assume that epoch leaders can
be byzantine and post invalid state commitments. We use a round
based interactive fraud proof protocol inspired from Truebit [37]
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Figure 11: State Commitment challenge
and Arbitrum [23] to detect such invalid commitments (we refer
the reader to [37] for a detailed explanation of the protocol). An
epoch is split into R rounds with each round consisting of G SMR
blocks. The interactions between the epoch leader and a challenger
is illustrated in Figure 11 can be briefly described as follows:
(1) The epoch leader posts Ss intermediate states for the chal-
lenged state.
(2) A challenger responds with a number indicating the first
intermediate state when the challengers view differs from
the leader
(3) The game continues to the next roundwith the leader posting
intermediate states for the smaller challenged state and a
new challenger responding according to 2.
The game ends when the conflict is resolved down to one trans-
action and that transaction is posted on the SMR. We note that the
number of rounds is Θ(logB).
Note that any node can be a challenger to exactly one shard of
its choice in a round, by doing so, it elects itself to the challenge
committee of that shard, however it is free to join any other shard’s
challenge committee in the next round. The dynamic challenge
committee makes the challenge protocol robust to an adaptive
adversary and we can claim that the state commitment protocol
satisfies validity and liveness:
• Validity: A state commitment corresponds to a valid state
if every challenge committee has at least one honest node,
which will not be violated w.h.p. since γi ≥ q/(1 + 2q)K (the
expected number of honest nodes is Nq/(1 + 2q)K which is
Ω(logK)).
• Liveness:A valid state commitment will be posted in expected
constant number of epochs.
4.2 Data Structures and Resource
Consumption
Let us define the overhead ratio as the ratio of (resource used to
maintain the SMR) to (resource used to maintain any one shard). We
define resource usage as a 3-dimensional vector: (1) Computation
(2) Communication and (3) Storage. We will compute the overhead
as the maximum value of the 3-dimensions. Here, we account for
resources consumed by all data structures involved in maintaining
the total ordered log; this is discussed in detail next.
Total ordered log: The ordered log is maintained by the SMR and
consists of the following entries:
• Shard block pointers: Consists of the tuple (hash of the
shard block, shard-id, mining proof). K such shard block
pointers are appended to the log for every shard block and
each pointer is of size logK . Resource usage = O(K logK).
• Shard State commitments: There areO(K) state commit-
ments per epoch. We set the epoch duration E such that in
expectation, there is one shard block per epoch. Resource
usage = O(K).
• State commitment challenge interactions: Consists of
challenges and replies from epoch leaders. There are O(N )
challenges in total which accounts for R = O(logB) interac-
tions. Resource usage = O(N logB).
• Data availability votes: Signed (Availability, shard block
hash). Constant size posted for K shard blocks and needs
O(N ) votes per shard block. Resource usage = O(NK).
• Data availability fraud proofs: Incorrect coding proofs
of size O(logB) for at most K shards. Resource usage =
O(K logB).
Shard rotation: A node rotating to a new shard needs to syn-
chronize to the state of the new shard. The synchronization involves
downloading the state corresponding to the latest state commit-
ment and processing shard blocks proposed after the latest state
commitment. The resource cost is O(1 + B) per new allocation. We
set the rotation interval every Tr blocks for the Free2Shard DSA
policy. A node also needs to synchronize to another shard if it is
chosen as its leader. The epoch leader election will elect a node with
probability O(K/N ) per epoch. We set Tr = K to get the resource
usage as O(B/K + BK/N ).
Data availability requests: A newly mined block receives re-
quests for O(N ) random chunks for the base CMT symbol of size
O(B/N ), resource usage = O(B logN ) per shard. Since each shard
has O(N /K) nodes, the load can be distributed equally amongst all
nodes, resource usage per node =O(BKN logN ). Each node receives
K chunks of size O( BN logN ). Resource usage = O(KBN logN ).
Total resource usage
The total resource usage per shard block is given byO(K logK +
N logB + NK + B/K + BK/N ) in all 3 resource dimensions, Thus
Overhead-ratio = O
(
K logK
B +
N log B
B +
NK
B +
K logN
N
)
= o(1), as
B becomes large and N > Ω(K logK). Note that we require N >
Ω(K logK) to ensure that our DSA algorithm throughput approaches
γ ; this requirement is also essential to guarantee the safety of state
commitment.
4.3 Summary
The building blocks and their interactions and the resources con-
sumed therein allow us to infer the following properties of Free2Shard.
(1) Safety of the shard ledger directly follows from the safety of
the total ordered log, maintained by the SMR engine. In this
manner, the core safety property (under adaptive adversaries,
cf. Section 2.5) of the SMR engine is extended to Free2Shard.
(2) Liveness. The DSA engine, along with the shard block min-
ing mechanism, guarantees that at least γ fraction of blocks
are honest in each shard over a long enough timescale (Theo-
rem 3.3). The random dynamic rotation ensures new honest
blocks are produced in each shard to maintain a consistent γ
fraction of honest blocks; this ensures liveness under adap-
tive adversaries.
(3) Scaling. As discussed above, the overhead ratio can be made
arbitrarily small bymakingB large. The average time interval
between consecutive shard blocks in a shard can increased
to ensure that the shard processes O(R) honest transactions
per second.
5 FREE2SHARD SYSTEM VIEW
We conclude the paper by discussing a variety of practical and real-
world system issues in implementing Free2Shard (and sharding
protocols in general) in distributed permissionless blockchains.
Heterogeneous shard throughputs. While most sharding pro-
tocols focus on allocating equal resources to all shards, in practice
different shards will have different throughput requirements. The
Free2Shard architecture is unique in being able to handle arbitrary
throughput requirements for different shards. In particular, con-
sider the extreme example where the number of shards is much
larger than the number of active nodes (N ≪ K ). Existing protocols
cannot operate in this regime, even though most of the shards are
at low levels of activity and throughput. As we showed in Sec 3.5,
the DSA algorithm can achieve optimal performance even in this
regime.
Heterogeneous resources. In practice, different nodes will have
different amount of computation resources. Particularly in permis-
sionless deployments, for example, in proof-of-stake, the amount
of stake held by a node need not match the amount of computation
power held by the node. In typical sharding protocols with a N2S
allocation, the nodes are allocated proportional to the stake and
not to their computation power. However in Free2Shard if a node
has high computation power, it can participate in multiple shards
and contribute state commitments as well as challenges in different
shards.
Asynchronous rotation. We have assumed that the honest nodes
rotate at every round t ; however, this may not be feasible in a
realistic setting. We now argue that our results hold if honest nodes
rotate only once every ∆ rounds. Let γi (t) = γi [n] ∀t ∈ {(n −
1)∆ + 1, ..,n∆} and βi [n] = ∑n∆t=(n−1)∆+1 1∆ βi (t) We observe that
γi (t )
γi (t )+βi (t ) is convex in βi (t), thus, the time-average of a given round
is lower bounded as follows:
n∆∑
t=(n−1)∆+1
γi [n]
γi [n] + βi (t) ≥
n∆∑
t=(n−1)∆+1
γi [n]
γi [n] + βi [n] . (22)
Thus, the optimal adversarial strategy is tomodify β at the same rate
asγ ; this shows that the previous results transalte to slower rotation
dynamics as well. Moreover, the results hold when nodes randomize
their rotation choice (choosing to rotate with probability 1∆ ). This
makes for a distributed implementation and has the added benefit
that asynchronous rotation alleviates network load by preventing
focused communication load at the same time.
A smallminority can stabilize the entire protocol. Not all hon-
est nodes need to follow Free2Shard-dist policy: Theorem 3.3 re-
mains true even if a small (but constant) fraction of the honest
nodes follow the policy. For example, the Free2Shard-dist policy
allows us to set γ = 0.1. We note that this is a very valuable prac-
tical setting, since many blockchains have their own foundations
that own sub-majority stake. In contrast to existing protocols, even
a small minority following the rotation policy can stabilize the
throughput of all shards in Free2Shard.
Inter-shard transactions: While we previously only discussed
intra-shard transactions, a large class of applications require inter-
shard support. State commitments can be used to facilitate inter-
shard transactions. Since a state commitment satisfies validity and
liveness, we can directly use existing inter-shard transaction pro-
tocols like Atomix [24]. A recent work [35] reported that these
existing protocols are susceptible to fatal synchronization attacks
andmessage replay attacks, we note that Free2Shard is not suscepti-
ble to these attacks due to global ordering. Inter-shard transactions
using this method require a latency larger than shard-commitment
duration. However, since there is a global ordering of transactions,
computationally powerful nodes can maintain a view of multiple
shard chains and certify an inter-shard transaction for a fast inter-
shard swap (earning some rewards on the way).
Incentives. Rational nodes are incentivized to follow the DSA
policy since the transaction fees on shards with lower than de-
sired throughput will be higher due to a high supply-demand gap.
Moreover, state commitment and data availability fraud proofs can
require deposits that can be snatched under clearly provable mali-
cious behavior. Thus nodes will be incentivized further to follow
the protocol.
Permissionless setting. An obvious extension of Free2Shard is
to permissionless proof-of-stake (PoS) systems. Here all that really
needs to be done is to replace the underlying SMR with a proof-of-
stake system like Algorand [21] rather than a permissioned system.
Finally, we consider the adaptation of Free2Shard to proof-of-work
(PoW). A natural approach is to elect a committee of PoW mining
participants from within the part of the blockchain that has reached
consensus and this committee serves as the participants of the
permissioned Free2Shard architecture. One way to achieve this is
via the hybrid consensus approach [33]: the committee consists of
a set of successive miners that are deep enough in the longest chain.
However, this approach is not safe against an adaptive adversary
- who can clearly bribe the set of chosen miners. A problem with
simply applying Free2Shard to this setting is the issue that miners
may arbitrarily decide to attack a given shard. We can solve this
problem here by using a hash-sortition between the SMR engine and
the shard block mining process - this idea is adapted from [6] and
was originally used in [19, 32]. The key properties of Free2Shard
all translate to this setting as well.
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A PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: Lower bound:
Let at := β1(t), bt = γ2β at +
γ
2K , l =
γ
2K , u =
γ
2 +
γ
2K ,ω =
2β
γ . We
have γ2K ≤ bt ≤
γ
2 +
γ
2K .
ψ (K) = min
{ γ2K ≤bt ≤ γ2 + γ2K }

1
T
T∑
t=1
bt−1
bt−1 + ( 2βγ bt − βK )

≥ min
{ γ2K ≤bt ≤ γ2 + γ2K }

1
T
T∑
t=1
bt−1
bt−1 + 2βγ bt
 =: ϕ(K) (23)
ϕ(K) = min
{l ≤bt ≤u }
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
bt−1
bt−1 + ωbt
}
(24)
Now, we call a time-instant t д-good if the throughput at that time
is greater than д. We will show that the adversary does not have
the ability to have a consecutive run of д-bad instances for more
than τ -periods. Suppose an instant t is not д-good. Then
bt−1
bt−1 + ωbt
≤ д
which implies bt ≥ bt−1r where r = 1−дωд . Note д ≤ 11+ω implies
r ≥ 1. Suppose there are τ consecutive д-good instances at time t .
Then bt ≥ bt−τ rτ . Given bt ≤ u and bt−τ ≥ l , we have u ≥ lrτ .
This implies tau ≤ logr
(
u
l
)
. Thus there is a д-good instant every
τ + 1 instances. This implies that the throughput is at least дτ+1 .
ϕ(K) ≥ д log r
log
(
ur
l
) ≥ д log
(
1−д
ωд
)
log
(
r
γ
2 +
γ
2K
γ
2K
) .
Consider a worst case scenario where β = 0.5, γ = 0.5, for all
д ≤ 11+ω = 1/3, choosing д = 1/4, and 1/2 + 1/2K ≤ 1, we get:
ϕ(K) ≥ 0.14log2(3K)
. (25)
Upper Bound:We demonstrate an adversarial strategy which
holds to the following claim: ψ (K) ≤ O( log logKlogK ). Compare the
denominators ofψ (K) and ϕ(K):
γ
6β at−1 +
γ
6K +
γat
3β +
γ
3K ≤ {
γ
2β at−1 +
γ
2K } + at
≤ { γ2β at−1 +
γ
2K } + at +
γ
K
We Observe ϕ(K) ≤ ψ (K) ≤ 3ϕ(K) and hence can rewrite our
claim as : ϕ(K) ≤ O( log logKlogK ).
We show an adversarial sequence to establish the upper bound.
Let the sequence bt be ℓ, ℓr , .., ℓrτ , 0, ℓ, ℓr , .., ℓrτ . We will calcu-
late ϕ(K) based on a single period. Recall ℓ = γ2K ,u =
γ
2 +
γ
2K . Note
lrτ = u, so τ = logr (ul ).
ϕ(K) ≤ τ
τ + 1
1
1 + 2r +
1
τ + 1
=
τ
τ + 1
1
1 + 2r +
1
τ + 1
[
1
1 + 2r +
2r
1 + 2r
]
=
1
1 + 2r +
2r
2r + 1
1
τ + 1
=
1
1 + 2r +
2r
2r + 1 ·
log r
log(cr )
where c = ul = K + 1. Choosing r = logK , we get
ϕ(K) ≤ 11 + 2 logK +
2 logK
2 logK + 1 ·
log logK
log(K + 1)
= O
(
log logK
logK
)
(26)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
A.2.1 Strategy space inequality. Let us define f (γ ) as follows:
f (γ ) = min
β
K∑
i=1
ui
γi
γi + βi
We now show that f (γ ) = (∑j √ujγj )2, using constrained Lagrange
optimization.
f (γ ) = min
β
K∑
i=1
ui
γi
γi + βi
s .t .
K∑
i=1
βi = β
obj =
∑
i
ui
γi
γi + βi
+ λ(
K∑
i=1
βi − β)
∂obj
∂βi
=
−uiγi
(γi + βi )2 + λ = 0
γi + βi =
√
uiγi√
λ
and
√
λ =
K∑
i=1
√
uiγi
substituting the value of λ in f (γ ), we get:
f (γ ) =
K∑
i=1
(√uiγi
K∑
i=1
√
uiγi ) = (
K∑
i=1
√
uiγi )2
Letv denote a sorted list of u sorted in a descending order and
pos(ui ) denote the position of ui inv with pos(maxui ) = 1.
We define u˜i as follows:
u˜i =
{
ui , if pos(ui ) ≤ s
0, otherwise
substituting γi = γ u˜i∑K
i=1 u˜i
, we get:
f (γ ) = γ∑K
i=1 u˜i
(
K∑
i=1
u˜i )2 = γ
K∑
i=1
u˜i ≥ γ s
K
K∑
i=1
ui
max
γ
min
β
K∑
i=1
ui
γi
γi + βi
≥ f (γ ) ≥ γ s
K
K∑
i=1
ui (27)
A.2.2 Modified strategy space inequality. Let us now modify the
policy γ to ensure that γi ≥ bs i f γ˜i > 0. Let γ˜i = γ u˜i∑K
i=1 u˜i
, we have
f (γ˜ ) ≥ sK γ
∑K
i=1 ui let us define γ as follows:
γ =
1
1 + q/γ Proj(Cq/s , γ˜ ),
where Proj(Cq/s , ·) is a projection of the s non-zero values of γ˜i to
the set Cq/s = [q/s, 1]s , the projection will cause at most s values
to grow by qs . Thus, we normalize all values by 1 + q/γ . We need
to ensure that γi ≥ bs ∀i ∈ [K], hence we get the inequality:
q/s
1 + q/γ ≥
q/s
1 + 2q ≥
b
s
⇒ q ≥ b1 − 2b
we set q = b1−2b , our modified γ now satisfies γi ≥ b/s .
We now have the following inequality
f (γ ) ≥ 11 + q/γ f (γ˜ ) ≥ (1 − 2b)f (γ˜ )
min
β
∑
i
ui
γi
γi + βi
≥ s
K
γ (1 − 2b)
K∑
i=1
ui
A.2.3 Stochastic strategy space inequality. We define the event
Ei (t) : Γi (t) ≥ cNγi (t), and E(t) : ⋂Ki=1 Ei (t)
Let us compute the tail bound on Γi (t) using the divergence
bound on binomial distributions, we get
P(Γi (t) ≤ cNγi (t)) ≤ e−nD(c
γi (t )
γ | |
γi (t )
γ )
D(c γi (t)
γ
| |γi (t)
γ
) = c γi (t)
γ
log(c) + (1 − c γi (t)
γ
) log(
1 − c γi (t )γ
1 − γi (t )γ
)
≥ (−c + c log c + 1)γi (t)
γ
≥ (−c + c log c + 1)γi (t)
≥ (−c + c log c + 1) b
K
P(Γi (t) ≤ cNγi (t)) ≤ e−n
b
K (−c+c log c+1). (28)
We use the divergence bounds derived above to lower bound the
event probability
P(E(t)) = 1 − P(E(t)c ) ≥ 1 −
K∑
i=1
P(Ei (t)c ) (29)
≥ 1 − se−n bs (−c+c log c+1) (30)
where equation 29 uses a union bound amd the fact that P(Ei (t)c ) =
0 for K − s shards which have γi = 0 and equation 30 is derived
from equation 28.
EΓ(t )
[
min
β (t )
∑
i
ui (t − 1) Γi (t)
Γi (t) + N βi (t)
]
≥ P(E(t)) min
β (t ),E (t )
∑
i
ui (t − 1) Γi (t)
Γi (t) + N βi (t)
≥ P(E(t))(
K∑
i=1
√
uicγi )2
≥ P(E(t))c(1 − 2b)γ
K∑
i=1
ui
≥ (1 − se−n bs (−c+c log c+1))c(1 − 2b)γ
K∑
i=1
u˜i
≥ (1 − se−n bs (−c+c log c+1))c(1 − 2b) s
K
γ
K∑
i=1
ui
EΓ(t )
[
min
β (t )
u(t − 1).r(t)
]
≥ h
K∑
i=1
ui
We want to lower bound (1 − se−n bs (−c+c log c+1)) ≥ 1 − ϵ , thus we
need
se−n
b
s (−c+c log c+1) ≤ ϵ ⇒ n ≥ s log(
s
ϵ )
b(−c + c log c + 1)
N ≥ s log(
s
ϵ )
γb(−c + c log c + 1) (31)
A.2.4 Approach to the convex set. We will now show that r¯(t)
approaches Ch with h = (1 − se−n
b
s (−c+cloдc+1))c(1 − 2b) sK γ .
Let πCh (t) be the projection of r¯(t) on Ch . Let us define a halfs-
paceH t+1 formed by the hyperplane P t+1, such that P t+1 is normal
to (r¯(t) − πCh (t)) and passes through πCh and H t+1 contains Ch .
The variables defined above satisfy the following equations:
πCh (t) = arд miny∈Ch | |y − r¯ (t)| |
πCh (t)i = hI {r¯i (t )<h } + r¯i (t)I {r¯i (t )<h }
πCh (t) − r¯(t) = u(t) ui (t) = (h − r¯i (t))
P t+1(x) :
K∑
i=1
(h − r¯i (t))+xi − h
K∑
i=1
(h − r¯i (t))+ = 0
such that u · x − h
K∑
i=1
ui = 0
H t+1(x) :
K∑
i=1
(h − r¯i (t))+xi − h
K∑
i=1
(h − r¯i (t))+ ≥ 0
such that u · x − h
K∑
i=1
ui ≥ 0
Let us define dt as the distance of r¯ (t) from the convex set Ch ,
i.e. dt = | |r¯ (t) − πCh (t)| | , d(a,b) = | |a − b | | for any a,b ∈ RK .
d2t+1 = d
2(r¯(t + 1),πCh (t + 1)) ≤ d2(r¯(t + 1),πCh (t))
=
r¯(t + 1) − πCh (t)22
=
 tt + 1 r¯(t) + 1t + 1 r(t + 1) − πCh (t)22
=
 tt + 1 (r¯(t) − πCh (t)) + 1t + 1 (r(t + 1) − πCh (t))22
= ( t
t + 1 )
2 r¯(t) − πCh (t)22 + ( 1t + 1 )2 r(t + 1) − πCh (t)22
+
2t
(t + 1)2 (r¯(t) − πCh (t)).(r(t + 1) − πCh (t))
(t + 1)2d2t+1 − t2d2t ≤
r(t + 1) − πCh (t)22
+ 2t ∗ ((πCh (t) − r¯(t)).(πCh (t) − r(t + 1)))
we know the following equations:r(t + 1) − πCh (t)22 ≤ h2K
(πCh (t) − r¯(t)).πCh (t)) = h
K∑
i=1
ui
(πCh (t) − r¯(t)).πCh (t)) ≤ EΓi (t+1)
[∑
i
ui (t)ri (t + 1)
]
Summing terms for t ∈ [T ], we get
d2T ≤ h2
K
T
+
2
T
T−1∑
t=1
t
T
(EΓi (t )
[∑
i
ui (t − 1)ri (t)
]
− (u(t − 1)).r(t))
The term Yt = (EΓi (t ) [
∑
i ui (t − 1)ri (t)] − ((u(t − 1)).r(t)) is a
martingale difference sequencew.r.t. history at time t and |Yt | ≤ 2hs
Given ϵm > 0, by the Azuma- Hoeffding inequality we have:
P
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
Yt
 > ϵm
)
≤ 2e−
T ϵ2m
8h2s2
Let us set ϵm = 2hs
√
2
T log( 2δ ), we get
P
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
Yt
 > ϵm
)
≤ δ
Thus with a high probability of 1 − δ , we have distance to the
convex set reducing as:
d2T ≤ h2
K
T
+ 4hs
√
2
T
log( 2
δ
)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4
At t = 1 the adversary is focused on KlogK shards, let those shards
form a set S1. Let the honest node allocate themselves as γ(2)
1
|S1 |
∑
i ∈S1
γi (2) ≤ 1 − β|S1 |
The median of γi (2) is less than twice its mean, thus median ≤
1(1−β )(logK )
K . This implies that the last
K
2 logK shards (arranged in
descending order of their honest fraction) will have honest fraction
less than 1(1−β )(logK )K .
The adversary now spreads only to K(logK )2 lowest performing
shards, this set is made up of the subset of the K2 logK shards dis-
cussed above since K2 logK ≤ K(logK )2 (for K > e2).
We can again show that the adversary allocates asγ(3) and show
that the last K22 logK shards (arranged in descending order of their
honest fraction) will have honest fraction less than 1(1−β )(logK )K
and the adversary now spreads only to K(logK )3 lowest perform-
ing shards, this set is made up of the subset of the K22 logK shards
discussed above since K2 logK ≤ K(logK )2 (for K > e2).
The attack continues till K(logK )τ = 1, the adversary cannot con-
centrate further. Solving the above equation, we get τ = logKlog logK ,
completing the proof.
B OTHER PRELIMINARIES
B.1 Verifiable Random Function
Verifiable Random Functions (VRF), first introduced in [29], gen-
erates a pseudorandom number with a proof of its correctness. A
node with a secret key sk can call VRFprove(·, sk) to generates
a pseudorandom output Fsk (·) along with a proof πsk (·). Other
nodes that have the proof and the corresponding public key pk
can check that the output has been generated by VRF, by call-
ing VRFverify(·, output,πsk (·),pk). An efficient implementation
of VRF was introduced in [16]. This ensures that the output of a
VRF is computationally indistinguishable from a random number
even if the public key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed.
